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Abstract The objective of this article is two folded. Firstly, we proceed to an analysis of the 
evolution of productive specialization in the enlarged EU, taking into account all its actual 27 
member countries. Given their decomposability properties, we use the entropy-based indices 
to measure countries’ relative specialization and then, given our rather short period of 
analysis, we use the bootstrap method to analyze the evolution of the specialization index. We 
first analyze all economic sectors and then, our analysis is more detailed focusing on 
manufacturing industries. Globally, we find that specialization is decreasing across all 
economic sectors, while it is increasing across manufacturing industries. Secondly, we study 
specialization determinants, with a special interest for the impact of foreign direct investment 
(FDI). For homogeneity reasons, we analyze two separate samples, one including only 
developed countries of the European Union and the other, only developing member countries. 
In order to take into account endogeneity highly probable of most of our independent 
variables, we use the vector autoregression (VAR)  technique and analyse the impulse 
response functions. Globally, FDIs seem to positively influence countries’ relative 
specialization, for our both samples and for both economic sectors and manufacturing 
industries. However, their impact appears weaker than most of the other independent 
variables, such as market potential or relative endowments. 
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In the context of economic integration, the literature (both empiric and theoretic) largely 
studied the phenomenon of economic agglomeration and its determinants, but, since the 
Classics’ era and the basic Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model, there has been 
surprisingly very little development in assessing and testing the determinants of 
specialization. A notable exception would be the new economic geography (NEG) models, 
but they deal explicitly with agglomeration rather than specialization. Their conclusions about 
specialization are based more on an interpretation of their results rather than on explicit 
modelling. Of course, in the light of the NEG models, the two notions are strongly dependent, 
often being referred to as the two facets of the same medal (Aiginger and Davies 2004; 
Cutrini 2009) because in fact they analyze the same economic variables (most often, 
employment or value added). Nevertheless, concentration and specialization are structurally 
different, given that their definition, even though based on the same economic variables, uses 
those in two different ways. The measurement of specialization implies an analysis of the 
productive structure of a country. It is thus a question of identifying if the country in question 
is active in a restricted number of sectors or its production activity is equitably distributed 
between the various sectors. The measurement of the geographical concentration implies an 
analysis of the distribution of the economic activities across countries. It is thus a question of 
identifying if the production of a certain good takes place in a restricted number of countries 
or if it is equitably distributed between them. Finally, Aiginger and Davies (2004) analytically 
deduced the mathematical relation between the two concepts and under certain conditions, 
concentration and specialization follow the same evolution: an increase in concentration is the 
equivalent of an increase in specialization. In this case, it is necessary that the countries and 
industries under study have the same size or that the shares of the countries and industries in 
the total activity remain constant over time.   3 
The impact of new economic geography models was tremendous with regard to the 
empirical research, by offering to the researchers many prospects. Certain studies were related 
to the determinants of the location choices of firms or more generally FDIs; other studies 
related to the measurement and/or the determinants of specialization or spatial concentration. 
Lastly, according to the predictions of the new economic geography on the agglomeration of 
economic activity, a special attention was given to the impact of trade liberalization on 
concentration. 
Considering the small number of studies existing on the determinants of specialization, we 
try thereafter to fill this gap through a study of the specialization indices calculated at the 
level of the EU27. Whereas most studies use the Gini index or the Krugman index to analyze 
concentration or specialization tendencies in EU15 or EU25 (Midelfart-Knarvik et al. 2000; 
Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman 2002; Dupuch et al. 2004 etc.), Brülhart and Traeger (2005) 
use the Theil index, but only for Western Europe. Globally, these studies show a decrease of 
activity agglomeration, thus of spatial concentration, and, at the same time, an increase of 
specialization. This seems a paradox, but still possible: it is enough for the share of each 
sector/industry or each country in total activity to change over time (Aiginger and Davies 
2004). These tendencies seem stronger with increasing economic integration. 
An analysis of all the 27 member states of European Union (EU27) having never been 
realized yet, we propose to use the indices based on entropy measure (e.g.: the Theil index) to 
study the evolution of the specialization over the period 1996-2005 and then, its determinants. 
Since the period of analysis is rather short (1996-2005), we use inference tests to determine 
significant changes in the level of specialization during this period. Two studies will be 
presented: first, we analyze all economic sectors; second we focus on manufacturing 
industries only. 
The 1996-2005 period is characterized by an acceleration of the economic integration 
process of the CEECs in the European Union, knowing that economic integration can take 
various forms: trade liberalization, technology diffusion, FDIs. More particularly, models 
developed in Fujita and Thisse (2006) and Vechiu (2010) showed that trade liberalization or 
technology diffusion  trigger FDIs towards the developing countries, but also that FDIs 
reinforce economic integration through the stronger bonds created between the countries. 
After a brief review of the literature dealing with specialization and concentration indices 
evolution and/or determinants (section II), we present some stylized facts based on the 
calculation of the generalized entropy indices and how it relates to inward FDIs in EU27 
member countries section III). In section IV, we will focus on specialization determinants, 
with a special interest in the role of the FDIs, while section V will conclude and give some 
future research perspectives. 
 
2 Literature review 
 
Globally the empirical studies dealing with specialization across economic sectors show that 
specialization increased in the EU15 (Amiti 1999; Brülhart 1998a and b, 2001a and b; 
Brülhart and Torstensson 1996; OECD 1999; Midelfart-Knarvik et al. 2002, 2003; Storper et 
al. 2002 etc). Combes and Overman (2004) present a review of the empirical work studying 
this subject and they also conclude to an increase of sectoral specialization in the EU15 
member countries. However, Dupuch and Mazier (2002) find that specialization decreased for 
these countries between 1980 and 1994. The least specialized countries were France and 
Finland, whereas the most specialized were Greece and Portugal, but also the United 
Kingdom because of the very important share of its finance services. The CEECs follow 
about the same evolution: since the years 1990 when their process of integration with the rest 
of Europe started, they became increasingly specialized in their exports (Crabbé et al. 2005).   4 
Regarding specialization across manufacturing industries, Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2002) 
find that it is inversely related to the size of the countries and their level of development (the 
analyzed period extends from 1970 to 1997): the smallest and the least developed countries 
are the most specialized. More precisely, the large countries of the centre are the least 
specialized (Germany, France, United Kingdom), the small countries of the centre being 
relatively more specialized (Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands) and the Scandinavian 
countries being the most specialized among the countries of the European centre. Lastly, the 
peripheral countries are the most specialized in the EU15 (Greece, Ireland and Portugal). 
Nevertheless, there are two essential exceptions: Italy and Spain. Italy is a large country of the 
centre, but whose specialization is similar to that of the small countries of the centre and 
Spain is a peripheral country that shows an unexpectedly low level of specialization. The 
three large countries of the European centre (France, Germany and United Kingdom) and 
Ireland, the notable exception, specialize in high technology, skilled labour intensive sectors. 
Greece and Portugal specialize in sectors using mostly unskilled labour and technologically 
weak. Spain, Austria and Belgium specialize in medium skilled labour and medium 
technology sectors. Dupuch and Mazier (2002) find that the least specialized among the large 
countries are the United Kingdom and France, whereas the small countries are more 
specialized. Aiginger and Davies (2004) find that globally, between 1985 and 1998, 
specialization increased in EU15 member countries, with the share of the largest industries 
increasing more quickly than that of the smaller ones, while the growth of the small countries 
was stronger than that of the large ones. This explains the decrease in manufacturing 
industries concentration while specialization was increasing. More precisely, these changes 
were significant especially in the years 1990, after the creation of the Single European 
Market. They also find that the largest countries specialize in large industries, which could be 
the result of the strengthening of intra-industry linkages in the large industries already 
localised in these countries. With a slightly different approach, Aiginger (2000) analyzes and 
compares specialization in production and exports. This author finds that specialization in 
production increased significantly, whereas that in exports dropped. Germany, Ireland and 
Italy became significantly more specialized in the two fields. The United Kingdom, Finland, 
Greece and Sweden knew an increasing specialization in production, but the opposite for 
exports. Lastly, Portugal knew a global decrease in specialization, whereas in the other 
countries the evolution of the two types of specialization is not clear. The CEECs also saw 
their degree of specialization increase (De Simone 2006; Longhi et al. 2003). 
So far, we have seen that  the distribution of economic activity across sectors has 
considerably changed depending on its aggregation level and on the time span. This could 
also be seen as the result of the different waves of economic integration, in accordance with a 
broader interpretation of the conclusions of the NEG models that are mainly about 
concentration patterns instead of specialization. Consequently, most empirical research based 
on these models deals only with the determinants of concentration. Nevertheless, from the 
formation of the great urban centres to the deindustrialization of the disadvantaged regions 
and while passing by vertical specialization and the rising power of developing countries, the 
link between integration and agglomeration/specialization has not been clearly established yet 
by the empirical research. For example, in Mexico, integration with NAFTA involved the 
relocation of the textile industry especially at the border with the United States and was 
reduced to subcontracting, knowing that before integration, it was rather concentrated 
geographically (Hanson 1996). Haaland et al. (1998) show that European integration had a 
positive impact on the industrial agglomeration between 1985 and 1992. Moreover, they 
identified in which type of countries certain industries tend to concentrate: wearing apparel 
and railroad equipment tend to concentrate in small countries, whereas motor vehicles, 
electrical apparatus and machinery and equipment tend to concentrate in large countries. Fiess   5 
and Fugazza (2002) present a review of empirical work on this subject and conclude that 
overall European integration involved the regional concentration of economic activity and a 
greater specialization in production. Hildebrandt and Wörz (2004) analyze the evolution of 
industrial specialization and the concentration of the activities in the CEECs, between 1993 
and 2000. They analyze manufacturing industries and find that there is an increase in regional 
relative concentration and an increase in specialization. Moreover, they show that compared 
with the EU15, the spatial concentration of manufacturing industries in the CEECs increased 
more quickly. Thereafter, their first econometric study on the determinants of spatial 
concentration shows a significant impact of FDIs, differences in technology, human capital 
and expenditure. But then, their second econometric study, at a more detailed level (by 
industry), largely overturns the previous one as it finds that the traditional determinants of the 
NEG are not significant for the CEECs and that FDIs have a significant impact only in two 
industries (electronic and mineral). Amiti (1999) studies only certain countries of Western 
Europe, through the Gini coefficient over the period 1976-1990. The author finds that 
specialization decreased in Spain, in Portugal and the United Kingdom immediately after 
integration in the EU. Her explanation is that before integration, there were barriers raised to 
protect industries in which these countries did not have a comparative advantage; once the 
protection was removed, competition increased and the countries had to develop industries in 
which they had comparative advantages. Globally, the author finds an increase in 
specialization, which implies that at least some industries became more concentrated, but the 
industries most concentrated in 1976 are not the same ones in 1989. The author analyzes also 
the determinants of the concentration, based on the theories of international trade and the 
NEG. She finds that scale economies and vertical linkages between firms are the strongest 
determinants of concentration. 
 
3 Stylized facts: a descriptive analysis of specialization and FDI trends in EU27 
 
As we have seen in the previous section, empirical research already studied the specialization 
of the Member States and also the geographical concentration of the activities in the EU, but 
no study was made on EU27. Also, references on the CEECs are very scarce compared with 
the abundant ones on the rest of the EU. All the studies on this subject relate mostly to the 
countries of Western Europe (Brülhart and Traeger 2005; Combes and Overman 2004; 
Midelfart-Knarvik et al. 2000; Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman 2002; Amiti 1999) or only 
some of these countries (Maurel and Sédillot 1999; Duranton and Overman 2005). Other 
articles relate to the ten CEECs new members of the EU or present national studies of some of 
these countries (Hildebrandt and Wörz 2004; De Simone 2006; Dupuch et al. 2001), with the 
major drawback of not taking into account the strong ties of the CEECs with the rest of the 
EU and their relative positioning inside the EU. To our knowledge, only one study analyzes 
EU25 (Dupuch et al. 2004) and also takes into account Romania and Bulgaria. However, the 
indices of specialization (the Krugman index) are based on exports, which can reflect in fact a 
change in the consumer's choices without having an impact on the real activity of the sector 
(Amiti 1999). 
Consequently, facing this lack of research on EU27 and especially on the CEECs, in this 
section we will use improved methods and data to analyze specialization in the wider EU27 
and present some stylized facts focusing on the link between specialization and FDIs. Most 
studies previously cited use the Gini or Krugman index, but here we chose to use entropy-
based indices (Brülhart and Traeger 2005), in both absolute and relative terms
1
                                                        
1 Unlike absolute indices, when calculating them for each country, the relative ones take into account the global 
distribution of economic activity across sectors/industries at EU27 level. 




. There are generally two types of entropy indices being used: 
those assuming a sensitivity parameter of 1, also called the Theil index that we shall note 
GE(1), and those assuming a sensitivity parameter of 2 that we shall note GE(2): 
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regions r 
 
ysr represents sector or industry s activity in region r 
R – the number of regions 
S – the number of sectors or industries 
 
The sensitivity parameter measures the weight given to the dispersion of the economic 
activity in sector or industry s and region r ysr at different parts of the distribution over s. 
Thus, when the sensitivity parameter is 1, the dispersion of ysr is given the same weight at any 
part of the distribution over s, whereas for a sensitivity parameter superior to 1, the dispersion 
of ysr is given a more important weight in the upper tail of the distribution. Furthermore, 
GE(1) allows a decomposition of inequality into within and between-country components, 
while GE(2) allows identifying countries’ contribution to global EU27 specialization
3
Thus, our sample contains the 27 EU member states, over the period 1996-2005. We have 
the choice between several variables like proxy for the level of activity in a certain sector: 
employment, production, value added, exports. We retain employment for two essential 
reasons. Firstly, regarding production and sectoral value added, the data are not available for 
our sample of countries and period of interest. Secondly, exports do not represent a better 
proxy than employment, because for example, a change in exports can simply reflect a change 
in consumer's choices without having an impact on the real activity of the sector (Amiti 
. Given 
that data at the regional level are not available for all the countries of the EU27 and the period 
of interest (1996-2005), we will use only the second decomposability property, the sectoral 
decomposition property of the generalized entropy index GE(2). Consequently, measuring 
entropy at the EU27 level represents a very original analysis, which should give a clearer 
image of the economic geography of the European Union. 
                                                        
2 We have also measured concentration using the same class of indices. For more interested readers, results are 
available on request. 
3 We let interested readers refer to Brülhart and Traeger (2005) for a detailed discussion and presentation of the 
mathematical details regarding both relative and absolute indices.   7 
1999). The data on employment for 25 of our 27 countries come from the Groningen 60 
Industry Database, which we complete with data coming from the ILO and Eurostat 
databases for Romania and Bulgaria, all data being at the national level. This could be seen as 
a homogeneity bias in our sample, but the number of observations for the two countries is 
rather small compared to the full number of observations. Two types of studies will be 
presented. Firstly, we study specialization across all the economic sectors, according to the 
ISIC rev. 3 classification. Secondly, we focus only on manufacturing industries, according to 
same classification. 
Globally, specialization measured through the GE(2) is higher than the one measured 
through GE(1), for the obvious reason that dispersion in the upper tail is given a more 
important weight. Here, we present tendencies only for GE(2) in relative terms, knowing that 
GE(1) that gives quite similar results and absolute indices are available on request. Relative 
indices are more relevant than the absolute ones, given that they take into account both the 
importance of a sector or industry in a country and the distribution of the same sector or 
industry across all the countries we analyze. They are all the more relevant, especially 
considering that we are interested in the European integration process under its many different 
forms and thus, in both the EU as a whole and the bonds created between its member 
countries. 
When considering specialization across all economic sectors, our conclusions are similar 
to the ones of the literature aforementioned: small EU countries are more specialized than the 
large ones and developed EU27 members are generally less specialized than EU27 developing 
member countries. More precisely, we find Romania, Bulgaria and Luxembourg as being the 
most specialized, with an increasing specialization over the period under study, whereas Italy, 
Finland, Austria, Germany are among the least specialized. However, we identify two 
exceptions from the general trends: Ireland and Spain, a small country and a peripheral 
country respectively, which should be some of the most specialized EU members, actually 
find themselves among the least specialized, especially Ireland. As for the CEECs, they are 
generally more specialized than the old EU members, but the most developed of them, such as 
Hungary or the Czech Republic, are among the least specialized countries. 
To analyze the evolution of specialization, considering the small number of years in our 
sample, we used bootstrap tests (Brülhart and Traeger 2005), which show that specialization 
is rather stable for most EU members. However, some slight changes appear: an increasing 
relative specialization especially in new member countries such as Poland or Slovenia and a 
decreasing absolute specialization especially in old member countries such as  Austria or 
Portugal. Among the old members of the EU, especially the small or the peripheral countries 
register significant changes and also Germany and France, which saw their specialization 
decrease globally. 
Finally, the sectoral decomposition of GE(2)  shows that the largest countries, like 
Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy contribute the most to EU27 specialization. Among the 
CEECs, the countries contributing the most to specialization are Poland, Romania, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary. We have also noticed the downward trend of the Polish and Romanian 
contributions and the upward trend of the Spanish contribution. At the beginning of our 
period under study Spain contributed less than Poland to EU27 specialization, whereas 
towards its end, it exceeds it. These trends are in line with the evolution of countries’ weight 
in total EU27 activity: Spain’s weight in total EU27 economic activity increases over the 
period, that of Romania and Poland drops. 
Considering  specialization across manufacturing industries, as it was the case for 
economic sectors, small countries such as Luxembourg, Ireland, Cyprus and Malta or 
peripheral countries such as Greece and Portugal are more specialized than the large ones, 
whereas the least specialized remain France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy. Among the   8 
CEECs, the most specialized are small countries such as the Baltic States and the least 
developed ones such as Romania and Bulgaria, while the least specialized are the most 
developed of them such as the Czech Republic and Poland. 
Compared to the results concerning specialization across economic sectors, the bootstrap 
tests showed significant changes in the productive structures of most countries, in relative as 
well as in absolute terms. Among the old EU members, all the core large countries (Germany, 
France, United Kingdom) except Italy saw their relative and absolute specialization increase 
in the manufacturing industries, as a result of the relocation of certain industries towards the 
peripheral old members or the CEECs. Among the CEECs, Bulgaria saw its specialization 
increase both in relative and absolute terms, while Slovenia and the Czech Republic saw 
theirs increase only in absolute terms. An interesting case is Poland whose specialization 
increased in absolute terms, but decreased in relative terms. 
The decomposition of GE(2) for specialization across manufacturing industries shows 
about the same tendencies that we identified for specialization across economic sectors. The 
large countries have a higher contribution to EU27 specialization, with an increasing 
contribution of Spain, Italy and the Czech Republic and a decreasing contribution of the 
United Kingdom, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. This is the result of the increase of Spain’s, 
Italy’s and Czech Republic’s  shares and the decrease of United Kingdom’s, Poland’s, 
Romania’s and Bulgaria’s shares in EU’s manufacturing sector. 
After analyzing the evolution of specialization, our next concern is about the factors 
behind this evolution, which could be resumed as fairly stable across economic sectors and 
rather increasing across manufacturing industries. Besides classic determinants of 
specialization such as market size or factor endowments, the international trade and economic 
geography theory also suggest economic integration under its many different aspects such 
decreasing trade and coordination costs, technology diffusion and especially FDIs. Given the 
very dynamic evolution of FDIs, we are particularly interested in the link between them and 
specialization trends in EU27. 
At a first glance, sectoral FDI and employment statistics tend to confirm a rather positive 
link between the two
4
Following the same reasoning, we find similar trends in Poland, Slovakia or Bulgaria. In 
Poland, the shares of FDIs and employment in total manufacturing go up together in wood, 
publishing and printing and in transport equipment, but down together in textiles and wearing 
. For instance, in Czech Republic, FDIs level in rubber and plastics 
industry increased about 700% between 1996 and 2005, while employment level in the same 
industry increased about 60%. This is one of the most spectacular increases in Czech 
Republic’s FDIs and employment over this period. Furthermore, they increased together also 
in relative terms: FDIs share in total manufacturing FDI went up from about 4% to about 6%, 
while employment share in total manufacturing employment went up from about 3% to about 
5%. Then, the same trends are followed in transport equipment: about 600% increase in FDIs 
level and about 34% increase in employment level corresponding to about 54% increase in 
FDIs share and 42% in employment share. We have noticed similar trends in electrical and 
optical equipment, about 31% increase in employment, but we do not have enough data to 
assess FDI increase over this period. Even more interesting evidence supporting a positive 
link between FDI and specialization is the trends followed by FDIs and employment in food 
industry, which has one of the highest shares in total manufacturing employment in Czech 
Republic. While FDIs continue to grow in this industry, as they globally do in almost all 
industries, their share in total manufacturing FDI is shrinking between 1996 and 2005, from 
about 18 to 10%. The same is true for employment: its share in total manufacturing 
employment decreased from 12 to 10%. 
                                                        
4 We refer to sectoral employment given that our specialization indices have been calculated based on such 
statistics.   9 
apparel, which are three of the main manufacturing industries in this country. Only in food 
products, they follow opposite trends: employment share increases while FDIs share 
decreases. However, FDIs level does go up over the period of interest. In Slovakia, wearing 
apparel, wood, publishing and printing and electrical and optical equipment saw their shares 
increasing in both FDIs and employment, while the food industry saw its same shares 




4 Specialization and FDI in the EU27 
 
4.1 Theoretic background 
 
Vechiu (2010) analyzes a theoretic model based on Fujita and Thisse (2006), where the 
importance of economic integration (seen as the decrease of trade costs but also as new 
information and communication technology diffusion) for the distribution of activity across 
space and sectors is highlighted. More precisely, we showed that wage and communication 
infrastructure differentials between countries are important determinants of industry 
agglomeration. The model combines economic geography and multinational firms theory. It is 
assumed that in the industrial sector, firms may separate their production unit from their 
headquarters (HQ) depending on production costs advantages offer by different regions or 
countries. Furthermore, all HQ are exclusively located in a developed region, while the 
production unit may be established together with the HQ (integrated firms) or in a developing 
region (multinational firms) depending on communication costs in each region and wage 
differentials between regions. According to these two criteria combined, the most competitive 
countries in absolute and/or relative terms are considered the best locations for their 
production units by multinationals firms (MNFs). Under these conditions, the FDIs 
undertaken by MNFs triggered by relatively good communications infrastructures and 
competitive wage differentials can push countries to increased specialization: developing 
countries offering the most competitive trade off between labour and communication costs 
will tend to specialize in industrial goods production, whereas developing countries with a 
less interesting trade off between labour and communication costs will tend to specialize in 
traditional goods production. Considering that HQs are exclusively located in the developed 
countries, the latter will specialize in services production. 
Consequently, in this section, we propose an empirical analysis of the determinants of 
specialization in EU27 member countries, with a special interest for the role of FDIs. To our 
knowledge, the link between FDIs and specialization has never been analyzed empirically at 
the level of the EU27. The only article dealing with specialization and FDIs is Dupuch and 
Mazier (2002), but they  take into account only EU15 without Luxembourg and Ireland, 
between 1980 and 1994, completely ignoring the economic integration of the CEECs. Then, it 
is all the more interesting as the locking-in in a kind of development trap, with specialization 
in low value added sectors remains a real threat to some developing countries. This issue finds 
its roots not only in certain models of economic geography (the developing countries would 
represent the periphery which produces only the traditional good, according to a technology 
with constant returns), but also in the theories of the international trade (Hecksher-Ohlin) or 
development economics (Baghwati). Today, as most developing countries receive FDIs which 
especially seek to benefit from low labour costs, we are tempted to believe that to a certain 
extent, this type of FDI will push these countries to specialize in low value added sectors, 
which in the long run will be not beneficial in terms of development. 
 
                                                        
5 These conclusions are based on authors’ calculations using FDI stocks from the OECD database online and 
employment from the Groningen database.   10 
4.2 Data and methodology 
 
From the model presented in Vechiu (2010) and the literature mentioned above, we could thus 
identify the main determinants of specialization:  
 
 economic integration 
 communications infrastructure 
 market potential 
 productivity differential 
 relative factor endowments. 
 
As in the previous section, first we analyze economic sectors and then, manufacturing 
industries. The determinants, their proxies and the data sources are summarized in Table 1 
below. With regard to specialization, we will use as the dependent variable the relative 
generalized entropy index previously calculated (GE2rel for economic sectors and GE2relm 
for manufacturing industries). Knowing that we are interested particularly in the impact of 
FDIs, we consider them as a proxy for economic integration. More precisely, we will consider 
stocks, because as compared to flows, they are more likely to influence countries’ 
specialization on the long run. For communications infrastructure, we will consider the 
number of fixed and mobile lines subscribers per 100 persons in relative terms compared to 
the EU27 average (Crel). For productivity differential, according to same logic prevailing for 
communications infrastructure, we will use labour productivity relative to the average EU27 
(Prodrel). For the relative factor endowments, we will consider the capital stock per capita 
relative to the average EU27 (Ktrel), for which we use as a proxy the gross fixed capital 
formation/total labour force ratio. Finally, for market potential, we will use as a proxy the 
indicator computed by Mayer (2008) following the Head and Mayer (2004) method, available 
online on the CEPII website (RMPhm). 
 
Table 1 Choice of variable and data sources 
Variables  Proxy  Data sources 
Specialization (GE2rel, 
GE2relm)  Relative entropy index  Authors’ 
calculation 
Economic integration 




Number of fixed and mobiles subscribers per 
100 persons (relative to the EU27 average)  UN, ITU 
Relative productivity 
(Prodrel) 
Labour productivity by person employed 
(relative to the EU27 average)  Groningen 
Relative factor 
endowments (Ktrel) 
GCF/labour force (relative to the EU27 
average)  UN/WB 
Market potential 
(RMPhm)  Head and Mayer (2004) indicator  CEPII 
 
Our equations to be estimated is thus written: 
 
     
 
lnGE2rel = lnFDIstp + lnCrel + ln Ktrel + lnRMPhm  (2)   11 
For homogeneity reasons, we use two samples: one containing only the developed 
countries of the EU and the other comprising only its developing members. More details 
about our variables are also given by Table 2 below that is showing some salient summary 
statistics for our both samples. 
 
Table 2 Summary statistics 
European Union Developed Member Countries 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
GE2relm  170  0.1396538  0.1296402  0.020966  0.64858 
GE2rel  170  0.0585053  0.0421458  0.012771  0.22245 
FDIstp  158  0.376879  0.3384329  0.0379872  1.548794 
Crel  170  1.141802  0.1931618  0.7407402  1.883404 
Prodrel  170  0.9828733  0.1739294  0.6448414  1.26525 
Ktrel  170  1.068803  0.4764045  0.453157  2.862745 
RMPhm  129  17.3019  1.095287  15.53241  19.7591 
European Union Developing Member Countries 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
GE2relm  100  0.2090889  0.2262123  0.029005  1.1895 
GE2rel  100  0.1627021  0.2070143  0.031025  0.90182 
FDIstp  100  0.2883936  0.1701983  0.0308523  0.864131 
Crel  100  0.652493  0.1984174  0.2754772  1.037196 
Prodrel  100  0.4622703  0.1617731  0.1431197  0.8953142 
Ktrel  100  0.2621956  0.1530328  0.0338081  0.6602598 
RMPhm  80  15.72331  0.57122  14.84654  16.97376 
 
Concerning methodology, our main concern is the endogeneity that is very likely to 
characterize most of our dependent variables. Especially, specialization may favour for 
instance FDIs in a certain sector, which is a quite common phenomenon during our period of 
study (1996-2005): many developing countries highly specialized in manufacturing receive 
the bulk of FDIs in this sector. The same may be true about productivity or the market 
potential: a higher specialization triggers a higher productivity thanks to the learning effect 
and this, may also lead to a higher market potential. The two stage-least square (2SLS) is 
quite a common method to deal with endogeneity, but its major inconvenient is that the good 
instrumental variables are very hard to find. Consequently, we choose the vector 
autoregression (VAR) technique, which suits well also because our empirical study is not 
structurally driven from a theoretical model but is based only on interpreting the results of 
different theoretical models.  
In the next section, first we analyze the determinants of specialization across all economic 
sectors by discussing impulse response functions for the developed members of the EU and 
then, for its developing member countries. Secondly, we analyze the determinants of 
specialization across manufacturing industries also by discussing impulse response functions 
for the developed members of the EU and then, for its developing member countries.  
 
4.3 Results and discussion 
 
In this section, we will present our results for specialization determinants, knowing that we 
are interested especially in the developing member countries of the EU27. So, after a brief 
discussion of the results for European Union developed member countries, which are mainly   12 
Western European countries plus Cyprus and Malta (EU17), we will focus more deeply on the 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), the new member countries. 
 
4.3.1 Economic sectors 
 
Regarding EU17, as expected, we find a positive impact of the FDI (Fig. 1), thus contributing 
to the reinforcement of these countries’ relative specialization, even though much less than 
the other variables we use in our study (their impact is depicted in Fig. 2). Globally, it seems 
also that the relative communications infrastructure, the relative endowments and market 
potential have a rather negative impact on EU17 countries’ specialization. This is in 
accordance with previous studies also mentioned in our literature review section: the higher 
the level of development, the lower the specialization. Finally, relative productivity has at first 
a slightly negative impact and then, it becomes positive. 
 
Fig. 1 The impact of FDIs on relative specialization across economic sectors in EU17. Note: 
The dashed lines represent the confidence interval, while the continuous line represents the 
relation between variables. A continuous line below the zero level axis indicates a negative 
correlation, while a continuous line above the zero level axis, indicates the opposite.   13 
 
Fig. 2 The impact of Crel,  Prodrel,  Ktrel  and  RMPhm  on relative specialization across 
economic sectors in EU17. Note: The dashed lines represent the confidence interval, while the 
continuous line represents the relation between variables. A continuous line below the zero 
level axis indicates a negative correlation, while a continuous line above the zero level axis, 
indicates the opposite. 
 
Regarding the CEECs, compared to EU17, the impact of most variables is globally 
stronger on their relative specialization. This shows that these countries are more sensitive to 
changes in their economic environment, which is easily understandable given that they are at 
an earlier stage of development when returns to scale are higher. 
Even though they have a strong negative impact at first (for a short period), finally in the 
long run, FDIs enhance the CEECs’ relative specialization (Fig. 3). We have very few data on 
the sectoral FDI, but they nevertheless enable us to note that, for example, in Czech Republic, 
the share of employment in the manufacturing sector drops over our study period, at the same 
time as the share of the FDI in this sector. On the contrary, the share of employment in the 
real estate sector is rising, passing from approximately 7% in 1996 to 10% in 2005, just as the 
share of the FDI in this sector, which passes from 0% to 18% and reaches even 20% in 2003 
and 33% in 2004. In Hungary, the share of employment in the manufacturing sector is 
decreasing (from 24% to 22%), at the same time as the share of the FDI in this sector lowers 
approximately from 59% to 37%. We find a similar pattern in trade, whose share of 
employment increases from 14 to 15%, while the share of the FDI in this sector increases 
from 15 to 18%.   14 
 
Fig. 3 The impact of FDIs on relative specialization across economic sectors in the CEECs. 
Note: The dashed lines represent the confidence interval, while the continuous line represents 
the relation between variables. A continuous line below the zero level axis indicates a 
negative correlation, while a continuous line above the zero level axis, indicates the opposite. 
 
The impact of the relative communications infrastructure is very weak compared to the 
other variables and it is mainly negative, as it was the case for EU17  (Fig.  4). An 
improvement of the communications infrastructure helps countries diversify the economic 
activity. Then, unlike in the EU17 countries, relative productivity has very strong negative 
impact, while factor endowments have a weaker positive impact (Fig. 4). Therefore, the more 
the labour productivity improves as compared to the EU27 average, the more the CEECs 
diversify their economic activity. But, on the contrary, the more capital they accumulate, the 
more the CEECs specialize. These two phenomena could be the result of a mere catching-up 
process. While increased productivity of an abundant labour force helps the CEECs diversify 
their economy, accumulating capital that is rather scarce in these countries forces them to 
specialize in order to maximize capital returns. Finally, the market potential has a weaker 
negative impact on the CEECs’ specialization (Fig. 4). This may be a sign that increasing 
national and international demand reflects the classic consumers’ love of variety and thus, 
countries’ need to diversify their economy in order to cope with it.   15 
 
Fig. 4 The impact of Crel,  Prodrel,  Ktrel  and  RMPhm  on relative specialization across 
economic sectors in the CEECs. Note: The dashed lines represent the confidence interval, 
while the continuous line represents the relation between variables. A continuous line below 
the zero level axis indicates a negative correlation, while a continuous line above the zero 
level axis, indicates the opposite. 
 
 4.3.2 Manufacturing industries 
 
Regarding EU17 countries’ relative specialization in the manufacturing industries, results do 
not change much from the previous. However, FDIs have a slightly stronger impact but still 
positive (Fig. 5), while quite notable differences can be noticed as regards labour productivity 
and factor endowments (Fig. 6). The impact of relative labour productivity becomes much 
stronger and definitely positive, while relative factor endowments have almost no impact at 
all. The two phenomena are very probably related and their explanation is the opposite to the 
one given previously about the impact of labour productivity and factor endowments in the 
CEECs: more productive but scarce labour can only be valued in few branches of the 
economy, while more capital in already capital rich countries is very unlikely to bring 
significant changes to their productive structure.   16 
 
Fig. 5 The impact of FDIs on relative specialization across manufacturing industries in EU17. 
Note: The dashed lines represent the confidence interval, while the continuous line represents 
the relation between variables. A continuous line below the zero level axis indicates a 
negative correlation, while a continuous line above the zero level axis, indicates the opposite. 
 
Fig.  6  The impact of Crel,  Prodrel,  Ktrel  and  RMPhm  on relative specialization across 
manufacturing industries in EU17. Note: The dashed lines represent the confidence interval, 
while the continuous line represents the relation between variables. A continuous line below 
the zero level axis indicates a negative correlation, while a continuous line above the zero 
level axis, indicates the opposite. 
   17 
In the CEECs, the impact of FDIs on relative specialization in the manufacturing industries 
seems weaker than relative specialization across all economic sectors, but still positive (Fig. 
7). This is rather straightforward given that the bulk of FDIs in the CEECs go to the 
manufacturing sector in general and less to certain manufacturing industries in particular. 
Then, the other variables have the usual impact (Fig. 8), except for factor endowments which 
now have a very strong negative impact reminding the one on EU17 countries’ specialization 
across economic sectors. This could be explain by the fact that in the manufacturing 
industries, which are the CEECs’ strongest asset, these countries might have attained a 
development level similar to the one the EU17 countries have in their global productive 
structure. On the other hand, if we think that the CEECs are specialized in mainly labour 
intensive manufacturing industries, capital accumulation may easily help them diversify their 
manufacturing sector by developing new branches, which are more capital intensive. 
 
Fig. 7 The impact of FDIs on relative specialization across manufacturing industries in the 
CEECs. Note: The dashed lines represent the confidence interval, while the continuous line 
represents the relation between variables. A continuous line below the zero level axis 
indicates a negative correlation, while a continuous line above the zero level axis, indicates 
the opposite.   18 
 
Fig.  8  The impact of Crel,  Prodrel,  Ktrel  and  RMPhm  on relative specialization across 
manufacturing industries  in the CEECs.  Note:  The dashed lines represent the confidence 
interval, while the continuous line represents the relation between variables. A continuous line 
below the zero level axis indicates a negative correlation, while a continuous line above the 




The enlargement of the European Union led us questioning on the evolution of the 
distribution of the economic activity, through its impact on the member countries’ 
specialization level. We retained indices based on entropy measure to analyze the evolution of 
the EU’s 27 member countries’ specialization across all economic sectors and, more in detail, 
across manufacturing industries. We were interested in measuring countries’ productive 
specialization and also in its determinants. First, after computing entropy indices to measure 
relative specialization, we use the bootstrap method in order to analyze if significant changes 
in specialization took place during our rather short period of study, from 1996 to 2005. Then, 
implementing the panel VAR method, we tried to analyze the impact of different variables on 
specialization, with a special interest for FDIs’ impact. 
Generally, the most specialized countries are the smallest or the least developed 
(peripheral) ones, with some exceptions. Across all economic sectors, Ireland and Spain, 
respectively a small country and a peripheral country, which should be among the most 
specialized, are in fact among the least specialized. Across manufacturing industries, we find 
Spain again with a lower than expected level of specialization and Italy, a large developed 
country, which should be among the least specialized, but it is among the most specialized 
countries. Among the CEECs, Romania and Bulgaria are as expected the most specialized, 
both across all economic sectors and across manufacturing industries. Hungary is the least 
specialized across all economic sectors, whereas the Czech Republic and Slovenia are the 
least specialized across manufacturing industries. 
As for the evolution of the distribution of the economic activity in the EU27, we found that 
the tendencies are not same according to whether we analyze specialization across all 
economic sectors or. More precisely, bootstrap tests show a decreasing tendency in   19 
specialization across all economic sectors, but an increasing one in specialization across 
manufacturing industries. 
Lastly, regarding specialization determinants, our panel VAR analysis shows that 
countries’ development level has an important role to play when assessing the impact of the 
main variables pointed by the theoretical literature on the subject. FDIs seem to have a 
positive impact on specialization both across economic sectors and manufacturing industries 
and at the same time, their impact appears to be globally more important in less developed 
countries (in our case, the CEECs) as compared to the developed ones (in our case, EU17). It 
is worth mentioned that this positive impact seems to appear rather in the long run in the 
CEECs, but rather in the short run in the EU17. Globally, the relative communications 
infrastructure and the market potential seem to have a negative impact, which is in accordance 
with earlier literature and our own descriptive analysis: more developed countries are less 
specialized. Then, depending on countries’ level of development, relative labour productivity 
and factor endowments may have different impact on specialization. In developed countries, 
relative labour productivity has a positive impact, whereas in developing countries, the 
opposite is true. The reverse is found for factor endowments, with the notable exception that 
in developing countries, where, given the general trends, we could expect a positive impact of 
capital accumulation on specialization across manufacturing industries, we find the opposite. 
This could be explained by the fact that the CEECs are specialized in mainly labour intensive 
manufacturing industries and thus, capital accumulation may easily help them diversify their 
manufacturing sector by developing new branches, which are more capital intensive. 
Our analysis points out that countries’ economic policy aiming to a balanced productive 
structure should be designed according to their level of development. For instance, in 
developing countries, such as the CEECS, the high benefits of FDIs in the short run could 
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